It comes as no surprise that Singapore’ total fertility rate (TFR) reached a new record low of 1.1 in 2020 (Chew, 2021). The general marriage rate is also in a gradual decline, with the 25-29 years age group registering the largest decline in 2019 compared to 2009 as the median age at marriage continues to slowly trend upwards (DOS, 2020). Although Singapore’s historic-low TFR in 2020 could be partly attributed to the pandemic which triggered a crisis mode, both materially and existentially, Singapore’s TFR has been in a general decline for quite a while due to the impact of modernity on the social expectations of marriage and parenthood. Nonetheless, the Singapore government has been actively working to shape these expectations through many social policies. Perhaps the most prominent and explicit of its interventionist endeavours is that of the periodic Marriage and Parenthood Packages (MPP) consisting of a set of measures that has over the time been enhanced and expanded. In principle, the MPP are provisions of support for couples. However, a closer look at the MPP would show that most of these measures can be considered primarily financial support to encourage marriage and childbearing. In fact, when it was first implemented in 2001, the MPP was framed as “the set of pro-family incentives and benefits … to encourage more Singaporeans to marry and have children” (HistorySG, 2015). The financial and incentive aspects of the MPP are thus unmistakable. However, as Singapore’s major policy initiative in supporting marriage and parenthood, the framing of the MPP is perhaps too focused on incentives and benefits, constraining the MPP to a predominantly financial endeavour.

It has to be reiterated that the MPP, in itself, is a valuable government effort. The focus on expanding and increasing the MPP financial support, such as cash bonuses for newborns, provides financial reprieve, especially for young parents as well as those who are financially strapped. The baby bonus is perhaps the clearest example of a financial support. It can also be considered a financial incentive, albeit in a limited sense. While most of the MPP measures are formulated to ease childbearing and childrearing expenses incurred by couples, they do not suffice as extrinsic motivators that can effectively sway couples who do not wish to have children. In other words, the MPP measures are targeted at “sitting on the fence” couples who wish to marry and/or have children but, for various reasons, could not afford to. For this reason, most of the MPP measures, particularly those with more obvious features of financial support, arguably lose their effectiveness in persuading couples, who do not wish to get married or have children, to do so.

There is also the issue of delaying marriage and childbearing among couples who intend to marry and have children. A 2013 survey of 2,000 single, never married, respondents on their perceptions of marriage and having children conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) found that out of those who indicated they definitely wanted to get married (n=1,197), 36% (n=428) felt that they would marry later than their ideal age of marriage (IPS, 2013). The trend in delaying marriage and childbearing is gradual but evident in the yearly reports of statistics on the median age of first marriage (DOS, 2020) and median age of citizen mothers at first childbirth (NPTD, 2020). The top reason cited for marrying later than the ideal age of marriage was the desire to be financially stable before marriage (33.3%) (IPS, 2013). The IPS (2013) report on the 2013 survey on singles further stated that its findings concurred with the previous findings which surfaced typical pragmatic considerations of couples in terms of opportunity costs (i.e., career or personal independence) and financial costs involved with marriage and parenthood (e.g., housing, parenting, and childcare costs). While it appears to justify the importance of focusing MPP measures on rendering financial support, what is perhaps missing in the equation are the specific reasons for the desire to be financially stable. This can be partially discerned from the National Youth Survey 2016 in which 70% of 3,531 youth respondents (aged 15 to 34 years) indicated having a “place of my own” as “very important”, far exceeding “to get married” (36%) and “to have children” (35%) (NYC, 2017). In the Singapore context where the “ownership” of subsidised public housing (the most common and sought-after “beginner” home for young couples) requires one to be legally married, the importance of a matrimonial home suggests an aspiration and, to some extent, a pressure to fulfil the social expectation of acquiring a matrimonial home as a precursor to or component of marriage. There can also be a pressure to fulfil the social expectations of marriage which involve acquiring a matrimonial home. This is exacerbated by an increasing expectation of the initial matrimonial home to be well furnished for comfort and to satisfy a certain quality lifestyle commensurate to a trending consumerist lifestyle. At the same time, the concern with financial costs can be due to a lack of a sense of certainty in meeting rising social expectations of marriage comfort and quality parenting which are reduced to a simplistic framing in financial terms. For example, rather than being able to strike a balance between work and childrearing, the couple may feel obligated to prioritise work commitment at the expense of the latter based on a view that financial stability will “solve” childrearing.

Regarding childbearing, another IPS survey of 2,000 married persons on the perceptions of the 2013 MPP found that the top five MPP measures that respondents in the 21 to 29 age group felt to have influence on their childbearing decisions were: (1) maternity leave (69.9%), (2) extended child care leave (66.5%), (3) enhanced baby bonus cash gift (65.9%), (4) paternity leave (64.8%), and (5) baby bonus child developmental account (64.2%) (Gee et al., 2015). Given the plethora of straightforward financial MPP measures, that three of the top five measures selected pertained to the work-life aspect of childcare (maternity leave, extended child care leave, and paternity leave) suggested that married respondents in their twenties might be seeking for a work-life balance that permits them to spend more time with their children. This corresponds with Call et al.’s (2008) study on 706 married individuals of childbearing years (45 years and younger) which found an overwhelming desire for greater workplace flexibility in terms of flexible worktime for full-time work. Call et al. (2008) further argue that while flexi-worktime option did not turn out to have significant impact on respondents’ current family sizes and fertility intentions, it was likely due to the limited availability of flexible work arrangements, and that if made widely available, most people will utilise it and this in turn may lead to increased childbearing. In essence, flexible work arrangements allow individuals to plan their time to suit family schedules, similar to the use of paid leave, without the financial constraints of part-time work. The 2020 coronavirus pandemic, incidentally, forced employers enforce work-from-home arrangements, where applicable, which likewise made available some degree of flexi-worktime for some employees.

Although the TFR and general marriage rate in 2020 do not seem to support the argument that work-life balance (due to employees’ increased presence at home) or flexi-worktime made possible by work-from-home arrangements (forced upon most employees whose work allow for them to do so) is conducive for parenthood or marriage, this is likely attributed to the crisis circumstance of the pandemic rather than the ineffectiveness of these new work arrangements. Notwithstanding the reported domestic challenges that many couples and families faced, given the sudden increase in the amount of time they spent together, it is arguably a rare opportunity for an inadvertent “reform” on work arrangements to be implemented in such a widespread manner in Singapore. This new normal makes us question how we manage and integrate work life and family life moving forward, providing us the chance to leave behind the conventional nine to six face-time intensive work routine, at least for those work functions and industries in which such new work arrangements are suitable for.

Just as employers have to adapt to this new normal, formulation of the MPP measures will also have to take into consideration the challenges and needs that surfaced from this period of change. Financial support remains crucial but should not be the main emphasis of the MPP. At the same time, policy does have its limits (Jones, 2012) but its limits in Singapore are mainly self-imposed by a MPP policy that remains heavily entrenched within a framework of financial support and benefits based on a view that financial reasons persist to be the main reason for delaying marriage and parenthood. Likewise, that the MPP appears to remain mostly targeted at couples who are sitting on the fence as well as conceptualising matchmaking and networking as key factors in addressing the issue of singlehood, it seems that the MPP is somehow rigged against itself due to a paradoxically narrow focus despite the slew of MPP measures. As long as political and economic agendas take primacy in the development of the MPP policy, it will be challenging to envision and/or promote alternative approaches and perspectives in fostering a conducive environment for marriage and parenthood. The need to reduce long working hours and decouple the notion of capital build-up and earning potential of spouses (mostly men) as precursors for marriage remains important (Jones et al., 2012) but inadequately addressed. Thus far, governmental efforts in enhancing the MPP policy’s financial support is both generous and commendable. However, they inevitably fall short of ever rising consumerist expectations of marriage life and parenthood. Besides being provisions of financial support, MPP measures can serve to reinforce in couples and singles the framing of marriage and parenthood from a parochial financial perspective. Furthermore, the interventionist approach of the state is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is well-intentioned policymaking that sought to update its policy measures to be relevant to the needs of the population. On the other hand, it reflects the ideas of governmentality with its curated approach comprising strict rules (e.g., housing criteria and means testing) and repetitive pro-family rhetoric (Strijbosch, 2015) which might have an inverse effect, putting off people who had enough of a paternalistic state’s nagging. Therefore, moving forward, there is a need to rethink the approach in the development of the MPP policy and other social policies in supporting marriage and parenthood. While policy will never be the panacea to Singapore’s declining TFR and marriage rate, the current changes in our work and home routines provide an opportunity to reassess the integration of work and family life in a way that would not have been possible before. This could help to reframe the perspective on work-life balance as well as the approach towards making a conducive environment for marriage and parenthood.

References

Call, L. L., Sheffield, R., Trail, E., Yoshida, K., & Hill, E. J. (2008). Singapore’s falling fertility: Exploring the influence of work-life interface. International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 34(1), 91-113.

Chew, H. M. (2021, February). Singapore’s total fertility rate falls to historic low in 2020. CNA. Retrieved from https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-total-fertility-rate-tfr-falls-historic-low-2020-baby-14288556

Department of Statistics [DOS]. (2020). Statistics on marriages and divorces, 2019. Singapore: Department of Statistics.

Gee, C., Yap, M. T., & Loh, S. H. (2015). Perceptions of the marriage & parenthood package 2013 report. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies.

HistorySG. (2015). Marriage and parenthood package is introduced: 2001. Retrieved from https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/history/events/da6a99f5-88ed-4758-865d-52e972e7a9f8#1

Institute of Policy Studies [IPS]. (2013). Perceptions of singles on marriage and having children report. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies.

Jones, G. (2012). Late marriage and low fertility in Singapore: The limits of policy. The Japanese Journal of Population, 10(1), 89-101.

Jones, G., Zhang, Y., & Chia, P. P. Z. (2012). Understanding high levels of singlehood in Singapore. Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 43(5), 731-750.

National Population and Talent Division [NPTD]. (2020). Population in brief 2020. Singapore: National Population and Talent Division.

National Youth Council [NYC]. (2017). The state of youth in Singapore 2017: Statistical handbook. Singapore: National Youth Council.

Strijbosch, K. (2015). Single and the city: State influences on intimate relationships of young, single, well-educated women in Singapore. Journal of Marriage and Family, 77(5), 1108-1125.